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Summary 
This thesis examines the British Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), which, between its creation in 1946 
and its end in 1964, gathered, collated and processed topographic, economic, scientific, and atomic 
intelligence. It did so on an inter-service, national level. The thesis examines the creation of the 
organisation, in the aftermath of the Second World War, exploring what factors and which people 
supported the creation of the new agency. It then moves on to examine the work of the JIB in 
several of its key fields of work, namely topography, economics and monitoring the threat from 
Soviet nuclear forces, before examining some of the JIB’s international connections and how these 
contributed to its work. It concludes with an examination of how the JIB begat the Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS). It argues that the creation of the JIB was an appropriate response to the 
need to centralise and retrench in the intelligence machinery after the War, but that the 
organisation, in essence, represented a compromise between those who wanted to fully centralise 
military (and military-relevant) intelligence and those who wished to preserve service 
independence. Over the course of its existence it made important contributions to several key 
areas of policy – including mapping the Soviet Union for nuclear strike planning, the economic 
containment of the USSR, as well as China and North Korea during the Korean War, and in 
monitoring the production of Soviet bombers and missiles – before becoming a central component 
of the new DIS. 
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Acronyms and Glossary 
 
A2  Air intelligence Section  
AEIU  Atomic Energy intelligence Unit  
ATB  Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War 
Basic-descriptive 
Intelligence reporting on the ‘facts’ of a situation, such as a state’s order of 
battle 
BEF  British Expeditionary Force 
BJSM  British Joint Services Mission 
BNE  Board of National Estimates  
CAS  Chief of the Air Staff 
Centralisation Non-departmental organisations collecting, analysing, and disseminating 
intelligence of inter-departmental or national value. 
CEP  Circle Error Probable 
CDS  Chief of the Defence Staff 
CIA  Central intelligence Agency 
CIGS  Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
CIU  Central interpretation Unit 
CJI  Coordinator of Joint Intelligence (Australia) 
CoCom  Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls  
CoS  Chiefs of Staff 
Current-reportorial  
  Intelligence reports dealing with current events or the very near future. 
DAEI  Division of Atomic Energy Intelligence 
DCDSI  Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Intelligence  
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DCI  Director of Central Intelligence 
DGI  Director General of Intelligence  
DIS  Defence Intelligence Staff 
DMI  Director of Military Intelligence 
DMO  Director of Military Operations 
DNI  Director of Naval Intelligence 
DRPC  Defence Requirements Policy Committee 
DSI  Division of Scientific Intelligence 
EAB  Economic Advisory Branch 
Elint  Electronic Intelligence 
ERP  European Recovery Programme 
ESTC  European Strategic Targets Committee 
FCI Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Sub-Committee   
GCHQ  Government Communications Headquarters 
GX  Code-name for captured Second World War German Imint 
ICBM  Inter-continental Ballistic Missile  
ICI  Imperial Chemical Industries  
ID  Intelligence Division  
IIC  Industrial Intelligence Centre  
Imint  Imagery intelligence 
IRBM  Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
ISIC  Inter Services Intelligence Committee 
IS(O)  Intelligence Section (Operations) 
ISTD  Inter-Service Topographical Department 
JAPIB  Joint Air Photographic intelligence Board 
JARIC  Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre 
JIB  Joint Intelligence Bureau 
JIC  Joint Intelligence Committee 
JIS  Joint Intelligence Staff 
5 
 
Jointery The process of cooperation between the three services and other 
departments through committees 
JPS  Joint Planning Staff 
JS/JTIC  Joint Scientific/Technical Intelligence Committee 
JTWC  Joint Technical Warfare Committee 
KGB Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti , Committee for State Security, 
USSR 
LRAF  Long Range Air Force 
MAC  Mutual Aid Committee 
MEW  Ministry of Economic Warfare 
MI5  Security Service 
Military Geography  
A term that incorporates geographical features of military significance: 
static defences, offshore defences, beach defences, shore defences, lines of 
defence and fortified areas, anti-aircraft artillery defence, the positioning of 
radar, telecommunications, and so on. 
MoD  Ministry of Defence 
MoS  Ministry of Supply 
MRBM  Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NID  Naval Intelligence Division 
NM  Nautical Mile 
NSC  National Security Council 
OEEC  Organization for European Economic Cooperation  
ONE  Office of National Estimates 
Operational Factual intelligence necessary for the conduct of military operations.  
Intelligence 
Osint  Open Source Intelligence 
OSS  Office of Strategic Services (US) 
RAF  Royal Air Force 
RCMP  Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
SECWP  Security Export Controls Working Party 
6 
 
SHAEF  Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Powers Europe 
SIS/MI6  Secret Intelligence Service 
Speculative Evaluative  
Intelligence reporting analysing the likelihood of future events or the 
developments of situations. 
SOE  Special Operations Executive 
STIB  Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch 
TAB  Targets Analysis Branch 
Topographic  
Intelligence Intelligence on all aspects of a target’s geography.  Monitoring 
developments related to military, social, and economic issues. Intelligence 
to provide planners with enough knowledge of a target to make all 
calculations on its attributes as a zone of combat. 
TRU  Technical Research Unit 
TNA  The National Archive 
USAF  United States Air Force 
USIB  United States Intelligence Board 
VCAS  Vice Chief of the Air Staff 
VCAS(I)  Vice Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence 
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The Joint Intelligence Bureau: Economic, Topographic, and Scientific Intelligence for Britain’s Cold 
War, 1946-1964  
 
Introduction 
Historians of British intelligence are enjoying an age of plenty. Facilitated by the Waldegrave open 
government initiative and the Freedom of information Act (2000), they can examine and exploit a 
wider range of documentary evidence than ever before.1 Both the Security Service (MI5) and the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) have marked their centenaries by granting selected historians 
access to their archives to produce ‘authorised’ histories.2 The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 
has followed suit; a twin-volume history is to be published. Other authors, such as Gill Bennett, 
formerly the Chief Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Alan Judd, a former 
intelligence officer, gained access to restricted files to complete their works on Desmond Morton 
and Mansfield Cumming.3 The fallout from Iraq and the 7 July bombings has produced a spate of 
reports that deal with the contemporary intelligence machinery. Public, official and academic 
discussion of intelligence matters is in robust health. Yet certain matters remain largely 
unaddressed in the literature. One of them is the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). This organisation 
                                                          
1 For a discussion on the impact of ‘open government’ see Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave 
Work? The Impact of Open Government Upon British History’ Twentieth Century British History, 9 
(1) (1998), pp. 111-126. 
2 Christopher Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 
2009). Keith Jeffery’s history of SIS is forthcoming, 2010. 
3 Gill Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence 
(Chippenham: Routledge, 2009); Alan Judd, Mansfield Cumming and the Founding of the Secret 
Service (London: Harper Collins, 1999). 
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was formed in 1946; it collected and collated economic, topographic, scientific, and, later, atomic 
intelligence; it merged with the service intelligence agencies in 1964, forming the Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS). This thesis aims to redress this neglect, and to give an account of the JIB, its 
creation, its work, and its end.4  
 The neglect of the JIB stands, in some respects, in contrast to the limited public exposure 
the agency enjoyed during its existence. Successive governments sought to prohibit, or at the very 
least control, publicity regarding Britain’s secret intelligence agencies after the Second World War. 
Michael Howard could still lament in 1985 that ‘so far as official government policy is concerned, 
the British security and intelligence services do not exist. Enemy agents are found under gooseberry 
bushes and intelligence is brought in by the storks.’5 The existence of SIS was officially denied until 
1992. But the JIB was not so secret; its creation, as well as that of its dominion counterparts, was a 
publicised affair: there was a notice in The Times.6 Kenneth Strong, its Director, gave a brief account 
of the creation of the agency in his autobiography, Intelligence at the Top, published in 1968.7 And 
the JIB features in another 1968 publication, The Organisation of British Central Government, 1914-
1956.8 Therefore, historians faced no more challenges from official secrecy in researching and 
writing the JIB than they would had they focused on the Security Service or SIS during the same 
time frame; indeed, they may have faced fewer. Yet studies of SIS and MI5 abound, whereas 
                                                          
4 Aldrich noted the dearth of writing about British military intelligence in 1998. Little has been 
produced on the subject since then. Aldrich, Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945-
1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p.87. The other thoroughly ‘understudied’ 
aspect of British intelligence is, of course, the work of GCHQ, although Aldrich has set out to rectify 
this with GCHQ (London: Harper Press, 2010).  
5 Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and Under-theorisation’, in Intelligence and National 
Security, 19 (2) (2004), p.171. 
6 ‘Defence Ministry Created’, The Times, 5 October, 1946. ‘Search for Unity in Empire Defence’, The 
Times, 7th November, 1946.  Accessed through the Times Digital Archive, 
<http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> 
7 See Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence 
Officer (London: Cassell, 1968). 
8 F. M. G. Wilson, The Organisation of British Central Government, 1914-1956 (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1968). 
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analysis of JIB does not.9 One must therefore conclude that the lack of close historical scrutiny of JIB 
has been more to do with interest than access - intentions, rather than capabilities.  
 It is a significant omission. Firstly, as the vignettes offered in the literature demonstrate, 
the JIB dealt with subjects of vital importance as Britain moved from World War, to Cold War, to 
high-Cold War: topographic intelligence; economic intelligence; industrial and scientific intelligence; 
and, later, atomic intelligence.10 The omission of the JIB means that, with the exception of atomic 
intelligence, these subjects remain undeservedly under-studied.11 Secondly, the JIB was an integral 
part of the struggle between those who wanted to centralise military intelligence and those who 
wanted to preserve Service independence, in intelligence and in general. The debates surrounding 
the creation of the JIB, its battle to expand its responsibilities, and the manner in which it 
eventually came to form the nucleus of the DIS, reveal much about the prevailing balance of power 
between ‘centralisers’ and their opponents, and how the agency garnered political support. These 
debates remain largely absent from the literature but are crucial if we are to understand why 
military intelligence was reformed in 1964.12  
Thirdly, the JIB was a very international agency. It maintained significant links with various 
American intelligence agencies. These links merit investigation, as they bear on British-American 
cooperation in several key areas – including economic warfare and nuclear targeting. Also, JIB 
London was at the centre of a network of Dominion JIB’s, each established at London’s urging, 
                                                          
9  See for example, Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 
2001); Nigel West, MI5: British Security Service Operations 1900-1945 (London: Bodley Head, 1981). 
Searching for ‘MI5’ on the British Library’s ‘Integrated catalogue’ yields 85 results; ‘MI6’ yields 67; 
‘JIB’ yields 49, some of which are JIB-drawn maps stored in the Library’s holdings, none of which is 
an analysis of the organisation or its history. <http://catalogue.bl.uk/F/?func=file&file_name=login-
bl-list> 
10 See Aldrich, The Hidden Hand (London: John Murray, 2001) p.213, p.221, p.559. 
11 See inter alia Aldrich, The Hidden, pp.371-392; Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: 
Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); 
Goodman, ‘With a Little Help from my Friends’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18 (1)(2007); Goodman, 
‘British intelligence and the Soviet Atomic Bomb’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 26 (2) (2003). 
12 Strong, Intelligence; Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank 
Cass, 2002), p.191; Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985). 
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which pooled their expertise, and functioned cooperatively by dividing the globe into spheres of 
responsibility. Even as Britain declined from a ‘first’ to a ‘second-tier’ global power it endeavoured 
to maintain a first-rate intelligence capability; the JIB’s international links appear to have been an 
important component of maintaining British ‘intelligence power.’   
 
Scope and focus 
This thesis seeks to fill several gaps in the literature. It seeks to answer three key research 
questions. Firstly, why was the JIB created? Secondly, what work did it conduct and how did this 
affect British policy? And thirdly, why, after eighteen years, was it merged with the service 
intelligence agencies to form the DIS?  
Answering these questions inevitably leads to the discussion of several other issues, 
including inter-service rivalry and the competition over responsibilities; the importance of Osint in 
British intelligence; the building and maintenance of liaison relationships; the importance of 
individuals in driving the development of British intelligence; as well as the centralisation of the 
national intelligence machinery. Each of these themes features prominently in the thesis. But the 
goal is to fill the gap in the intelligence historiography and to write the JIB into the history of 
Britain’s Cold War.  
 
Centralisation and National Intelligence 
Centralisation is a thread that links most aspects of the thesis. The following chapters are 
something of an evolutionary tale, describing a particular era in the centralisation of the British 
intelligence community. Centralisation – non-departmental organisations collecting, analysing, and 
disseminating intelligence of inter-departmental or national value – had progressed at a relatively 
leisurely pace since the creation of Britain’s first intelligence organisations in the 19th Century. 
11 
 
Organisations like the Security Service and later the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) were early 
examples of centralised organisations.13 Later, in 1936, in response to the growing German threat 
and the need to coordinate the diffuse service intelligence assessments with a political dimension, 
the Joint Intelligence sub-Committee was established, under the Chiefs of Staff. After a shaky start, 
the JIC grew in stature during World War Two and became the keystone of the British intelligence 
community.14  
 Centralisation in military and military-relevant intelligence progressed slower. Indeed, it 
required the pressure of war. Several non-departmental, or joint, agencies were established to deal 
with matters such as photographic reconnaissance and prisoner interrogation. And because, as 
Michael Herman notes, ‘tri-service warfare, especially the amphibious invasions of Europe, could 
not be planned on a single service basis and needed similarly integrated intelligence support’ 
national intelligence agencies were established to collect topographic and operational 
intelligence.15 The Inter-service Topographical Department (ISTD) and the Intelligence Section 
Operations (IS(O)) begat the JIB. But the services resisted further centralisation in the immediate 
aftermath of the War. Instead of centralising all military intelligence in a single, tri-service 
organisation, ‘ “jointery” – cooperation between the three services and other departments through 
committees – became the standard British solution in intelligence.’16 Between 1946 and 1964 the 
JIB worked within this model, and quite successfully so, it appears. But it and its supporters also 
rocked the boat by pushing for more responsibilities and a move from ‘jointery’ to centralisation in 
military intelligence. 
 The experience of the war was crucial in persuading many that military intelligence should 
be transferred to a non-departmental organisation. Indeed, centralisation became something of an 
                                                          
13 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
p.260. 
14 For the development of JIC see Goodman, ‘Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK’s Joint 
Intelligence Committee’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21 (1)(2008). 
15 Herman, Intelligence Power, p.260. 
16 Ibid, p.262. 
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international trend, with the British, Australians, Canadians and the Americans developing central, 
national intelligence gathering and assessment organisations over a similar timeframe. The manner 
in which Britain and its allies were grappling with similar issues and developing different solutions is 
an interesting area of study. Particularly interesting is the manner in which the Americans dealt 
with the problems of military-relevant intelligence organisations, creating the Central intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and later the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at roughly the same time as Britain 
created the JIB and the DIS. As will be illustrated, the Americans developed more centralised 
organisations but did not develop centralised national intelligence machinery to the same extent as 
Britain; the central agencies’ work continued to be duplicated by the services and State 
Department.  
The central intelligence zeitgeist was a consequence of the war, when centralised 
organisations had proven effective and cheaper than maintaining individual service sections. And, 
crucially, intelligence for the Cold War needed to be more scientific and professional. Men like 
Kenneth Strong did not believe that the service agencies were best equipped to operate in such a 
manner. He noted how some of his intelligence reports on German use of anti-aircraft weaponry in 
anti-tank roles before the war had been discounted, as senior officers did not believe that such 
adaptation was possible. Military intelligence agencies were conservative institutions and prone to 
the so-called ‘not invented here syndrome’.17 Also, ambitious officers in the military did not aspire 
to a career in intelligence, and intelligence postings were relatively short. Therefore, intelligence 
did not attract real talent nor did it nurture expertise. Indeed, in their 1945 report on the future of 
the intelligence machine, JIC Secretary and JIC Chair, Dennis Capel-Dunn and Victor Cavendish-
Bentinck’s noted the Services’ general failure to pay appropriate heed to intelligence.18 Centralising 
was perceived as crucial to save money, increase professionalism, and improve performance.  
                                                          
17 Strong, Intelligence, p.17. 
18 CAB 163/6, Report to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 10 
January, 1945. 
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 This development, as well as being a process to improve efficiency and save money, was 
indicative of the fact that military intelligence, other than in a strictly tactical sense, did not really 
exist. Rather, agencies, even military ones, had to collect intelligence which would have to be 
collated and analysed in tandem with every other agency’s product to produce national 
intelligence. As Strong put it in his autobiography,  
the speed and complexity with which military, political, scientific, and social factors 
can interact, and the rapidity of social and political change make completely anachronistic 
the type of intelligence estimating machinery that leans heavily on elaborately insulated 
departments studying specialist fields of human activity.19  
Or, put another way, intelligence could no longer be viewed as a single department’s 
prerogative and property; departments had to cooperate. The age of total and nuclear war had also 
to be the age of total intelligence. Fighting wars and gauging threats was more than a matter of 
understanding an adversary’s military strength. Its economic, scientific, technical, topographic, and 
political characteristics had to be studied with the military: they were two sides of the same coin. 
And, because they were relevant to service and political departments, they were best collated and 
studied centrally at the national level. 
The JIB was an important step in the direction of central, national politico-military relevant 
structures. But, as Strong noted, at the time of its establishment it was impractical to centralise 
military intelligence further, as the military intelligence organisation had to match the structure of 
command, which was still fragmented. There was also strong opposition from the services, who 
believed the JIB undermined their independence. Overcoming this resistance was a gradual 
process. The following chapters will demonstrate how the JIB absorbed significant extra 
responsibilities over the course of its existence and also how the issue of centralising military 
intelligence in a national agency gathered enough political support to become a reality. 
                                                          
19 Strong, Intelligence, p.224. 
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Personality 
Several authors have highlighted the importance of individuals in shaping the British intelligence 
community, one of them was Kenneth Strong, in his book Men of Intelligence.20 Ironically, however, 
nobody has examined the importance of Kenneth Strong, who enjoyed a lengthy career in British 
intelligence before becoming the first Director of JIB, and then Director of DIS. Strong fought an 
unrelenting battle for centralisation throughout his tenure at the JIB; he was ultimately successful. 
He was instrumental in forming the Dominion JIB network, to exploit for the UK the benefits of the 
‘residual Empire’. He was a man with vision and, equally importantly, connections. He maintained 
excellent relations with senior American political and intelligence figures, having served in Europe 
as Eisenhower’s General Staff Level Officer for military intelligence, or G2. Indeed, he got on 
‘famously’ with the General, who, when promoted to SHAEF in 1944 and split from Strong, 
appealed over the head of Allan Brooke directly to Churchill to have him continue as his intelligence 
man.21 ‘As President, Ike never found the replacement for General Strong he was looking for.’22 
These relationships facilitated Strong’s access to the American corridors of power, and doubtlessly 
boosted the prestige of the JIB on both sides of the Atlantic. His life in British intelligence is worth 
examining. 
 Strong was the key figure in the development of the JIB but there were other equally 
important personalities involved in creating and ultimately ending the JIB.  The wartime Chairman 
of the JIC, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, and Dennis Capel-Dunn were the brains behind the new 
organisation. Even as the war raged they considered the shape of the post-war intelligence 
                                                          
20 See, for example: Gill Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery; Alan Judd, Mansfield Cumming and 
the Founding of the Secret Service; Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Roles and 
Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War One to the Present (London: Cassell, 1970); 
Patrick Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life of the Ninth Duke of Portland (London: 
Bodely Head, 1986); Thomas G. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The 
Development of a Modern Intelligence Organization (Frederick: University Publications of America, 
1984) . 
21 Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (New York: 
Doubleday and Company ltd, 1981), pp.124-5. 
22 Ibid, p.243. 
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machinery; it was they who proposed a ‘Central Intelligence Bureau’ which developed into the JIB. 
Their influence on the retrenchment of the British intelligence machinery will be examined in the 
first chapter. And, just as there were key figures in the agency’s establishment, during the early 
1960s, Lord Mountbatten and Denis Healey were extremely influential in merging the service 
intelligence agencies and the JIB in the Defence Intelligence Staff in the face of determined 
opposition by the services. It is unlikely that those intelligence officials who favoured and strove for 
centralisation, like Strong, would have succeeded without their support. In examining their efforts 
and significance this thesis will add to the body of literature which presents key individuals as being 
decisive in driving the development of British intelligence. 
 
Organisation and structure 
Achieving the goals of the thesis in the available space is, in some senses, ambitious. The JIB was an 
agency with a relatively long pre-history. It was created as part of Dennis Capel-Dunn and Victor 
Cavendish-Bentinck’s drive to retrench Britain’s intelligence machinery for peace and the Cold 
War.23 It absorbed the responsibilities, and some of the staff, of several wartime agencies. These 
agencies were the ISTD, which gathered and distributed topographical intelligence on an inter-
service basis, the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), which gathered and collated economic 
intelligence; and the IS(O), which gathered and collated ‘factual’ intelligence that was outside 
ISTD’s remit but relevant to military operations.24 Therefore there is an extensive pre-history that 
could be explored, one that would focus on economic and topographic intelligence in the inter-war 
years and during the War, the successes and failures, and how these culminated in the JIB. 
                                                          
23 See Aldrich, ‘Secret Intelligence for a Post-war World: Reshaping the British Intelligence 
Community, 1944-1951’, in Richard J. Aldrich (ed), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 
1945-51 (London: Routledge, 1992). 
24 CAB 81/130, JIC (45) 226 (Final), ‘Joint Intelligence Bureau’, July 24 1945. 
16 
 
 As well as having a ‘long history’, the JIB carried extensive responsibilities. Its original 
charter determined that it would ‘collect, assess, and where appropriate appreciate intelligence 
material of inter-departmental significance.’25 It would undertake responsibility for intelligence on 
the ‘economic resources of foreign countries in relation to any probable war condition,’ and all the 
duties of the ISTD.26 But this original charter was soon superseded. The JIB came to absorb the 
Division of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) in 1954, and later became responsible for atomic intelligence. 
Its brief was dynamic, and a study of its operations could be approached in several different ways. 
One could, for instance, focus solely on its economic intelligence analyses. This, however, is clearly 
limiting. Nevertheless, it is impracticable to study the full scope of its activities over the whole 
period of its existence.  
Moreover, each addition in its responsibilities was accompanied by debate and 
disagreement over the role of the agency vis-à-vis the service intelligence agencies – who, in 
Kenneth Strong’s words, ‘never really liked’ the JIB.27 This was most visible in the early 1960s, as the 
project to centralise defence intelligence in a more powerful Ministry of Defence gathered steam. 
Kenneth Strong offers a brief insight of the debates in his autobiography, as does Philip Zeigler in 
his biography of Lord Mountbatten, an ardent supporter of centralisation.28 But nowhere is the 
story narrated or analysed in detail. There is therefore scope to approach the subject ‘structurally’, 
to study the development of the organisation as a bureaucratic and political entity, as Davies does 
in his study of the SIS, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying.29 
 Given the multitude of possible approaches, structuring the thesis was something of an 
exercise in circle-squaring. To follow any one of the approaches outlined above would have been 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 This would include economic mobilisation planning and preparations, and economic warfare 
planning in foreign countries; effects of technical developments on economic war potential; and 
the vulnerabilities of potential enemies’ economies to attack, among other subjects.  
27 Strong, Intelligence, p.191. 
28 Ibid; Zeigler, Mountbatten, p.632. 
29 Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
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problematic for two reasons. Firstly, this is the first dedicated history of the JIB. It was therefore 
judged that a broader study – incorporating the pre-history, the creation, an investigation of the 
JIB’s work in various fields, the development of the organisation, and the political wrangling over 
consolidation and centralisation – was most appropriate. Secondly, there is the matter of sources. 
As is outlined in greater detail below, the literature offers glimpses into the JIB but little of 
substance. There is however a great deal of material on the JIB and its activities available in The 
National Archives. But it is poorly catalogued, spread throughout various departments’ files, and is 
in no way comprehensive. Additionally, some important subjects, such as the JIB’s role in 
intelligence for nuclear targeting, remain thoroughly obscured by official secrecy. Thus, whilst 
constructing a more general history is feasible, conducting a sustained analysis into any one aspect 
is more problematic. Therefore, the thesis is not an organisational history, nor is it strictly focused 
on the JIB’s work in any one particular field. It is a broader, more general history that encompasses 
the entire period of the JIB’s existence, 1946 to 1964, and it examines a range of the JIB’s most 
important activities. The approach is similar to that utilised by former JIC Chairman Percy Cradock 
in his book, Know Your Enemy.30  
The introduction outlines where and how the thesis fits in the literature and the sources 
available to the historian of the JIB. The first chapter focuses on the debates surrounding the 
organisation of British intelligence for the post-war world, and the creation of the JIB. The following 
chapters, 2-7, examine various aspects of the JIB’s work during the following 18 years. Chapter 2 
examines the JIB’s work in gathering and processing topographic intelligence to 1953, the effect 
this had on the perception of the Soviet threat, and how it contributed to British nuclear targeting 
in the early Cold War. Chapter 3 examines the JIB’s economic intelligence, first in peace and then 
during the Korean War. It examines how the JIB’s intelligence supported the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) regime and how intelligence influenced British 
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policy on trade with the Communist world up to 1954. Chapters 4 and 5 are focused on the JIB’s 
assessments of the Soviet bomber and missile threat, first during the atomic age, and then in the 
age of the hydrogen bomb. They delve into the JIB’s role in understanding the threat and the 
sources it had at its disposal; they compare British and American estimates during the bomber and 
missile ‘gaps;’ and they engage with the organisational development of the JIB, how it absorbed 
scientific intelligence in 1954 and atomic intelligence in 1957, and how the JIB’s growing influence 
in the area of missile and bomber analysis led to conflict with the Air Ministry.31 Chapter 6 examines 
the structure and nature of the JIB’s international liaison relationships. It focuses on the 
relationship with the Americans, the networks of Dominion JIBs, and some of the JIB’s contacts in 
the business world. Finally, chapter 7 examines the end of the JIB and the creation of the DIS. This 
chapter delves into the arguments deployed by the services to retain their individual intelligence 
prerogatives; and how key individuals like Kenneth Strong and Lord Mountbatten were 
instrumental in the drive to centralise military intelligence.  
This structure is clearly somewhat ‘artificial’ in its focus. The JIB did not cease to gather 
topographical intelligence in 1953, nor did its work in analysing the Soviet economy pause in 1954. 
The approach is, however, valid.  The structure is designed to introduce the JIB as comprehensively 
as possible in a limited space. Also, the nature of the subject imposes genuine limits on the amount 
of documentary evidence that can be accessed for any particular aspect of the JIBs work, or for 
certain periods. For example, studying the impact of JIB intelligence on targeting plans during the 
late 1950s is not feasible. The structure is partly a reflection of this limitation.  
Moreover, the structure is a reflection – albeit an imperfect one – of the evolution of the 
JIB’s priorities and its development as an organisation, from one focused on topography and 
economics, to one with responsibility for scientific intelligence, to nuclear intelligence, to the DIS in 
1964. Britain’s knowledge of Soviet topography was very limited in 1946. Consolidating and 
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improving it was a key task for the nascent JIB. Planners required analyses of the new enemy, an 
enemy that had only recently re-emerged as an intelligence target. In particular they required 
intelligence for targeting, both conventional and nuclear. The JIB had to devote significant energy 
to this task during its formative years, and it is an aspect that merits examination. This is 
particularly so, as a significant amount of the JIB’s mapping of the USSR appears to have been 
conducted during the early years of the Cold War. British and American intelligence agencies 
benefitted enormously from topographic material gathered during the occupation of Germany; as 
the chapter will illustrate, without this bounty Western understanding of Soviet topography would 
have been dire. The JIB noted in 1957 that stocks of native Soviet maps were ‘substantially 
unchanged’ since its last survey in 1950.32  
Another of the JIB’s key functions, indeed, probably the most important during the early 
Cold War, was economic intelligence. As one Foreign Office official noted in 1949, ‘I think I can say 
that the main energy of JIB is devoted to a study of Soviet war potential and Soviet economic 
weaknesses about which Strong claims they know a great deal.’33  Monitoring the Soviet economy 
was a major preoccupation for British intelligence throughout the Cold War, but the subject held 
particular resonance between 1948 and 1954 as this was a period of considerable British-American 
disagreement over trade with the USSR, and the Communist world in general. Britain favoured 
more trade; the Americans favoured restrictions. Both sides deployed their intelligence analyses in 
support of their policy preferences – policies that were maintained unilaterally, and multilaterally, 
through CoCom and its list of prohibited goods. However, once the Korean War ended, and the 
Cold War cooled again, the west agreed on a consolidated list of items prohibited for trade and the 
intensity of the debate was moderated. Clearly, economic intelligence continued, but 1954 offers a 
tidy point to move on, having demonstrated how JIB intelligence influenced British policy in peace 
and war. 
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Linked to the JIB’s economic intelligence were its analyses of Soviet military output, in 
particular its analyses of bomber and missile production. These analyses bore on some of the most 
complicated questions of the Cold War: when could the Soviet Union deliver an atomic bomb, and 
later a hydrogen bomb, to British and American soil? And how large an attack could they deliver? 
Chapter 5 overlaps temporally with previous chapters to illustrate the JIB’s legacy in this field, and 
the sources it could exploit. Chapter 6 examines these assessments and associated issues after 
1954, which was a significant year for the JIB as it absorbed the Division of Scientific Intelligence 
(DSI) and became more involved in the scientific analyses of missiles and bombers, having 
previously focused on analysing production. This was finalised a short while before the Soviets 
tested their first true H-bomb, which held dire implications for British survival in any future war. In 
its wake, assessments of the bomber and missile threat acquired a new resonance. Moreover, 1954 
witnessed the beginning of the American intelligence community’s ‘bomber gap’, which later 
developed into the ‘missile gap.’ Recent literature has outlined how Britain did not agree with 
inflated American estimates, and it is instructive to examine the JIB’s assessments to gain further 
insights into why such close allies disagreed.34  
Both chapters engage with the growth of the JIB’s responsibilities. In 1954 the JIB became 
responsible for scientific intelligence and in 1957 it became responsible for the collation and 
presentation of all atomic intelligence. This thesis is not focused on atomic intelligence and 
assessments per se. The development of British atomic intelligence encompasses far more than the 
JIB – involving multiple collection agencies, several assessment bodies, particular transatlantic 
relations, and key personalities. The JIB is, in several respects, peripheral to the subject for most of 
the 1950s, and engaging with the subject in the limited space of a chapter can do it little justice; 
other authors have produced impressive studies of British intelligence on the Soviet nuclear 
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programme and there is little need to retrace their steps.35 There is also the question of limited 
sources, which restrict analyses of the impact of JIB on the field. However the JIB’s adoption of 
atomic intelligence made it the most important collating and assessment body with regards the 
Soviet strategic threat. This was indicative of its development as an organisation, and brought it 
into bureaucratic conflict with the Air Ministry, which sensed that the JIB was infringing upon its 
prerogatives. Indeed it was clear that the principle of centralisation was gaining ground by the early 
1960s. Therefore, the thesis will engage with the issue from the perspective of centralisation. 
The examination of the JIB’s liaison with various international partners breaks from the 
chronological flow of the previous chapters. Two reasons account for this. Firstly, it is a significant 
issue that is touched upon in each preceding chapter but not explored in depth. Secondly, the 
documentary evidence outlining this cooperation is very limited. Therefore, the chapter depends to 
an extent on the accumulated weight of the examples presented throughout the thesis to first 
outline the mechanics of the liaisons, and then to characterise them more conceptually.  
Culminating with the end of the JIB affords us the opportunity to examine many issues. 
Foremost among them is the relationship between the supporters of increased centralisation in 
military intelligence and their adversaries. In 1946 the centralisers failed to achieve their aspiration 
of a central military intelligence service; by 1964 they succeeded. Efficiency and financial savings 
were central factors in the creation of DIS; numerous reviews had noted that despite the creation 
of JIB duplication was still prevalent in military intelligence. People like Strong had long argued that 
centralisation was necessary to get better intelligence, more efficiently. But, equally, a coalition of 
influential military and political figures had come to see the centralisation of defence planning and 
administration under an expanded Ministry of Defence as a way to rationalise defence 
procurement, spending, and planning. Earl Mountbatten, for instance, believed that centralising 
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intelligence would demonstrate that the benefits of centralising in general outweighed any 
potential costs. They supported Strong, and were central drivers in the creation of the DIS. Thus, 
the creation of DIS was, in a sense, the result of a long-term pincer movement, with intelligence 
figures like Strong pushing from the shadows, and people like Mountbatten and Minister of 
Defence Peter Thorneycroft leading the charge on the more illuminated, political sphere. This 
chapter will explore the process and the resistance to the DIS. 
 
Building the JIB archive 
To research the subject, two basic principles were followed: start with what is known, and cast your 
net wide. These applied both to the literature and to the documentary evidence, both of which 
have their particular limitations.  
 It has long since been noted that many major studies of the Cold War neglect the role of 
intelligence. 36 It was the missing dimension. But much has changed since 1984 when Christopher 
Andrew and David Dilks noted this.37 Many studies of British intelligence touch upon the work of 
the JIB; they offer insights and leads to archival sources. But the limited coverage raises more 
questions than answers. There are many studies of economic warfare, technology, and strategy in 
the Cold War. But few have systematically engaged with intelligence, fewer refer to the JIB 
(although the odd  reference features occasionally). They do however offer vital context, and raise 
questions about the role of intelligence in general and the JIB in particular.  
 
                                                          
36 Major works that make no mention of cold war intelligence include Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin; 
Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982); Martin 
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol: 8: Never Despair (London: Heniemann, 1988); For a general 
Discussion see, Andrew, ‘Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War’, Review of 
International Studies, 24 (3) (1998). 
37 Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence 
Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984). 
23 
 
Creation 
There is an extensive literature on intelligence in the Second World War and the post war period. 
This material engages in some detail with the JIB’s antecedents, the MEW, the ISTD, and the IS(O). 
Hinsley’s volumes on British Intelligence in the Second World War are most significant, but his work 
is by no means alone in this regard.38 Wesley Wark, and others, offers a detailed examination of the 
evolution and role of economic intelligence and the MEW during the inter-war and wartime years.39 
They outline the importance of economic intelligence in monitoring the growth of German military 
potential, and how, once war was declared, economic intelligence contributed both to the blockade 
and to drawing analyses for direct economic warfare. They clearly illustrate both the importance of 
economic intelligence and how difficult it was to collect good economic intelligence from a police 
state. In terms of topography, the Second World War literature presents some of the weaknesses in 
British topographic intelligence during the early stages of the War; how, for example, Britain was 
slow to utilise aircraft to aid with mapping, and how various operations, including Operation 
Menace, the allies’ 1940 operation to capture the port of Dakar, were hampered by poor 
topographic intelligence.40 The literature also outlines the necessity of a central clearing house for 
factual intelligence, and how the IS(O) supported the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), the services and 
the ISTD by collating and making accessible the mass of basic factual information required for 
military operations.41 It was of these organisations, their responsibilities, strengths and 
shortcomings, the JIC was thinking when it established the JIB.42  
                                                          
38 See for example, Bennet, Churchill’s. 
39 See Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Donald Cameron Watt, ‘British intelligence and the Coming 
of the Second World War in Europe’, Ernest R. May (ed), Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence 
Assessments Before the Two World Wars (Guildford, Princeton University Press, 1984). 
40 F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and 
Operations. Vol: 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), pp.132-133 and pp. 154-156. 
41 See for example Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy 
and Operations. Vol: 2 (London: HMSO, 1981) p.13. 
42 Hinsley, British Intelligence, Vol: 1, p.292. 
24 
 
 There is also a relatively considerable literature on the shift from war to peace. Several 
authors offer a perspective on the reorganisation of British intelligence more broadly; many 
consider the most important development to be the cementing of the position of the JIC. Cradock, 
Aldrich, Goodman, Davies outline how the JIC developed from being ‘very much a peripheral 
organisation’ in 1936 to being something of an executive body by the end of the war – one that 
coordinated the various intelligence organisations, evaluated intelligence, advised the Chiefs of 
Staff and managed intelligence priorities.43 In 1945, there was no question of downgrading the 
position of the JIC, at the head of the intelligence apparatus. Cavendish-Bentinck had persuaded 
the COS of the need to maintain the managerial structures.44 And the war had ‘given the concept of 
the intelligence organisation as a whole, civilian and military, a new reality.’45  
 As Aldrich illustrates, the major reorganisation took place below the level of the JIC.46The 
JIB was part of this reorganisation, and several authors engage with its creation. Indeed, the JIB’s 
creation is the best-documented aspect of the organisation’s existence; the literature offers 
answers to several key questions. Cradock, Davies, Aldrich, Twigge and Scott, and Strong outline 
that Cavendish-Bentinck was instrumental in forming the agency in 1946.47 The War had 
demonstrated the value of centralising some vital inter-service intelligence functions; there was a 
definite need for topographic and economic intelligence for the post-war world; many people 
believed that the service intelligence divisions were prone to duplication and inefficiency. These 
were problems that could be alleviated by centralisation.48 They also identify the significance of the 
new organisation. Twigge and Scott describe it as the ‘major’ organisational change in the 
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intelligence machinery, and note that the appointment of Strong held ‘significant implications’ for 
transatlantic intelligence relations.49   
This thesis will build upon the foundation established by these authors, who offer concise 
answers to several key questions, but little sustained analysis. We know little about the process of 
establishing the JIB, how the Bureau was shaped, or who worked for it.50 There is also little analysis 
of two further issues. Firstly, there is the significance of the Bureau in terms of centralising British 
military intelligence. In his autobiography, Strong notes that he believed that military intelligence 
would need to be centralised further, over time. The Bureau was the first step. This development 
merits further analysis. Secondly, there is the matter of institutionalising Osint in the new agency. 
The JIC believed that Osint had been an under-utilised source during the inter-war period and 
wartime, and that the JIB should focus on gathering and collating Osint for the Cold War.51 Thus, 
the thesis will expand upon the work of the aforementioned authors, and engage with these under-
examined themes. It aims to add a hitherto missing Cold War dimension to the work on British 
military and military-relevant intelligence conducted by several scholars and to widen our 
understanding of this under-studied subject.52 
 
Topography and targeting 
Some of the earliest British intelligence work was topographic. In 1803, the Victorian War Office 
had established the Depot of Military Knowledge ‘to collect, mostly from overt sources, maps and 
information on the military resources and topography of foreign powers’. The fortunes of this 
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department waxed and waned, and it morphed into the Topographic and Statistical Department, 
and then the Intelligence Bureau in 1873. Similarly, the Naval hydrographer’s department was 
active in gathering intelligence on enemy topography. According to Andrew, the Russian threat 
convinced the Admiralty that a more dedicated intelligence office was needed, and the rumblings 
of discontent eventually led to the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Division (NID).53 Being a 
trading nation and an imperial power, it is natural that mapping the world was a priority for Britain. 
And there is a body of literature that examines the organisation and significance of topographic 
intelligence from the Eighteenth-Century to the Second World War.54 
 We have only fleeting glimpses of British topographic intelligence after 1945 –Aldrich, for 
instance, outlines a JIB study of the flammability of Soviet cities and the importance of intelligence 
gathered in occupied Germany.55 Other studies that touch upon the issue include Maddrell’s Spying 
on Science, which outlines how Western intelligence agencies used returning German prisoners of 
war and scientists to discover the geographical spread to the Soviet industrial and military-
industrial complex. But generally, topographic intelligence is absent from the literature.  
However, understanding the topography of its new potential enemies was of vital 
importance to Britain and its allies during the Cold War. The JIC understood this, noting in 1945 that 
there would ‘certainly be a need in peace time for the work of the ISTD.’56 Similarly, Sherman Kent, 
a veteran of the OSS, devoted a fair proportion of his study of intelligence analysis, Strategic 
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Intelligence for American World Policy, to the question of topographic intelligence. He notes that 
nations should be aware of the geography of their adversaries, and keep abreast of developments 
in geography as it related to military, social, and economic issues.57 ‘Their basic aim was to provide 
the strategic planners with enough knowledge of the country in question to make his over-all 
calculations on its attributes as a zone of combat.’58 This was as important when facing the Soviet 
enemy as it had been for the Nazi menace. 
Topographic intelligence was crucial for war planning: it outlined the extent of Soviet 
expansion, in terms of roads and railways, and thus part of their capability to wage and sustain war; 
it was vital to plan for targeting, conventional and atomic. But the role of the intelligence in 
targeting is surprisingly absent from the nuclear history literature.59 Rather, the focus is on subjects 
including target systems, counter-force or counter-value, and the controversy over securing access 
to the American strategic plan, which was denied to Britain due to the restrictions of the McMahon 
act until 1958.60 It is not the aim of this thesis to engage in the debates over British target 
priorities.61 But intelligence exists to support policy; therefore it will investigate how the JIB 
supported targeting policy by providing analyses of various target systems and by cooperating with 
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American partners. In so doing the aim is to begin to fill a gap in the literature on British nuclear 
strategy.   
 
Economic intelligence  
The economic Cold War is understudied in most major analyses of the conflict.62 For example, 
offensive, or proactive, economic containment does not feature prominently in Gaddis’ work.63 
Similarly the biographies and autobiographies of the major politicians reveal little of the economic 
Cold War and the intelligence support it received. Alan Bullock’s biography of Bevin and Attlee’s 
autobiography, As it Happened, for instance, shed little light on intelligence. Nor do biographies of 
Hugh Dalton and Stafford Cripps.64 An exception to this general rule in the literature is John Young’s 
study of Churchill’s second premiership, which offers an insight into the creation of the 
international trade control regime and British attitude towards it, but again neglects the 
intelligence angle.65 Much of the American literature is similarly sparse in its engagement with the 
economic Cold War.66 
The literature on the economic Cold War generally focuses on the establishment, politics, 
and operation of CoCom – the primary mechanism for controlling and harmonising allied export 
control policy. Known in British circles as ‘The Paris Group’, it began to function on 1 January 1950 
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and operated by debating and monitoring three categories or lists of trade – one of strategic goods 
generally prohibited for export to the USSR (list 1); goods of indirect strategic value, to be exported 
only in limited quantities (list 2); and goods to be monitored (list 3).67  
The most significant study of CoCom is Mastanduno’s Economic Containment. This, and his 
associated work, highlights the difficulties the US faced, and its ultimate failure, in imposing its will 
regarding trade policy on its European allies. It explores the evolution of the US’s belief that its 
interests would be best served if the USSR was excluded from the liberal economic order, and how 
this led to a policy of economic warfare: ‘weakening an adversary’s economic potential in order, 
ultimately, to weaken its military capabilities or potential.’68  
This was largely a bureaucratic war and two lists of restricted goods were the primary 
American cannon, list 1-A and 1-B – the former including goods of high strategic significance, and 
the latter goods of secondary significance. Unilaterally, however, this policy would be of little 
practical value as European manufacturers could fill the void. Gaining Western European 
cooperation was vital, but Western Europe only accepted a tighter export control regime with the 
outbreak of the Korean War and the altogether more threatening strategic environment, and then 
only briefly, abandoning economic warfare with the thawing of tensions in 1954.69  
 Because of the international nature of CoCom, Mastanduno’s work offers an insight into 
British policy. However, it is generally subsumed into a wider narrative focused upon Western 
Europe. Britain and France restricted trade of certain goods on the grounds of national security, 
drawing their own lists in 1948 and operating bilaterally by 1949. But Britain and France did not 
agree with the US lists. Initially, Britain only barred 121 of 163 items on the 1-A list of strategic 
goods. Nevertheless, a consensus of sorts emerged and with it an institutional mechanism to 
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enforce it. This led to the establishment of the multilateral system of CoCom and the Consultative 
Group (CG), the latter operating as a forum of senior representatives from the participating 
governments who would meet to resolve policy disputes and set general guidelines for the Western 
embargo.70  
Britain played a significant role in the politics of export control, in particular with regard to 
the general Western retreat from economic warfare in 1954.71 The recent literature on Britain’s 
economic Cold War makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of this episode of alliance 
politics and containment policy. Two authors have made the most significant additions to the 
literature, Ian Jackson and Frank Cain. Others, such as Young, have focused on specific instances of 
the trade war. 
These authors illustrate the multiple pressures on British policy: its need for economic 
recovery, desire to contain the Soviet Union, and urgent need to placate a consistently hostile 
American legislative branch.72 It was this combination of factors that led to Britain’s adoption of 
what Jackson describes as a ‘double-edged trade policy towards the Soviet Union’, that of trade and 
embargo.73 There is, after all, no doubt that British policymakers and departments were acutely 
aware of the Soviet threat. But it was considered that an economic warfare approach would 
adversely affect Britain’s economy, and lessen its capability to contribute to the defence of the 
West.74 Therefore, early British policy focused upon only controlling goods of a direct military value.  
This policy was controversial. American Congressmen refused to accept that the European 
nations that were being underwritten through the European Recovery Programme were 
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simultaneously selling goods to the Soviet Union. Congressman Karl E. Mundt tabled an 
amendment to the Marshal Plan with a view to preventing this trade. Passed as section 117(d) of 
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, it threatened the withdrawal of Marshal aid to 
transgressing states.75 Britain stood relatively firm; ‘senior civil servants seriously considered the 
suggestion that London should accept a reduced allocation of Marshall aid rather than sacrifice 
non-strategic East-West trade.’76 Instead Britain sought to alter the international export control 
regime to accommodate both US and Western Europe’s economic interests. With close cooperation 
from the French, an alternative, shorter list was drawn as the basis for a selective strategic 
embargo.77 But, in a capitulation of sorts, Britain unilaterally introduced wider export controls on 
strategic items in April 1949.78 
This development led to closer cooperation with the French, which yielded a jointly agreed 
list of restricted items. The Anglo-French list eventually formed the basis of the CoCom lists, but 
Anglo-American policies and views did not converge.79 Britain still refused to adopt the American 1-
B list.80 Its objection was based on the fact that ‘these items were a valuable source of income for 
the British economy.’81 This continued until the Korean War, which precipitated a new set of 
pressures upon Britain and its European CoCom partners, who capitulated and embargoed a broad 
range of goods to China and all trade with North Korea.  
From initial stubbornness to awkward compliance, the literature demonstrates that Britain 
followed a relatively independent course with regards its trade policy. Indeed, it occupied a 
powerful position in the Western alliance, bridging the demands of the Americans with the needs 
of the Europeans. Its influence was similarly felt in the negotiations regarding the nature of CoCom 
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controls after the Korean War. Churchill, who had reoccupied Number 10 in 1951, was, by then, an 
ardent supporter of relaxing restrictions on East-West trade.82 This passion led to further clashes 
with the Americans as both parties reviewed the trade regime late in 1953. The issue was resolved 
to neither party’s satisfaction, although Mastanduno believes that on balance it represented a 
victory for the British position. The international list was cut from 474 to 252 categories of items, 
and the emphasis was shifted to those items which were of primarily military value.83 
However the literature barely touches upon the role of intelligence in supporting policy. 
There are references to the CIA’s analyses of the vulnerability of the Soviet Economy in 
Mastanduno’s work; Cain’s work on British policy mentions that CIA sat on the American steering 
committee convened to establish which commodities were of value to the USSR.84 But they do not 
offer an in depth analysis.  
Only one chapter, thus far, has focused on intelligence and the trade war. Cain’s study of US 
intelligence and the problem of French trade with the Eastern Bloc introduces us to American 
intelligence and the embargo. The CIA and the military establishment drew up lists of barred items. 
But the intelligence effort was a broad one: serving State Department officials gathered trade 
intelligence; additional material was supplied by the Department of Commerce, the US Munitions 
Department, and the service intelligence agencies.85 Participating countries’ compliance with the 
embargo was monitored, and although the CIA could not necessarily prevent suspect transactions it 
could provide necessary intelligence to raise the matter in CoCom. This occurred when the US 
detected France selling Junkers Ju-52 aircraft to Bulgaria.86 American intelligence also monitored 
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the effectiveness of the trade embargo, concluding in 1949 that the trade embargo was ‘having the 
desirable effect of hampering the USSR’s war potential.’87  
This raises questions about the role British intelligence played in British trade policy. There 
is a rare and cursory reference to the JIB, to be found in Cain’s work, in the context of discussions 
between the US and UK on the composition of the 1-A lists.88 And Maddrell, in his study of scientific 
intelligence in occupied Germany, goes furthest in demonstrating the significance of intelligence to 
the process of trade control, highlighting that intelligence was crucial to the CoCom process.89 What 
is missing, however, is a thorough engagement with collection and analysis, or the transatlantic 
intelligence dialogue.  As is demonstrated in the literature, economic concerns were a crucial 
determining factor in British policy, but it would surely have not followed the path of trade if it 
believed it to be detrimental to its own security. The thesis will explore this issue, examining JIB 
analyses and how they influenced British economic containment and economic warfare policy 
during peace and war. 
 
Missiles and bombers 
The literature engaging with British intelligence on the Soviet bomber and missile programmes is 
limited. This is in contrast to the research that has been conducted on British intelligence and the 
Soviet atomic weaponry programme, most notably Spying on the Nuclear Bear by Goodman.90 It is 
in marked contrast with the literature on the American intelligence community’s collection and 
assessment of the Soviet airborne threat.91 However, several authors do engage with aspects of the 
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subject, offering interesting insights into four key themes: the issue of sources, inter-agency rivalry, 
the differing views of the British and American intelligence communities on the scale, and 
imminence of the bomber and missile threat facing the US and UK.92  
This thesis intends to build upon these researchers’ work. However, there are several 
obstacles to a comprehensive analysis. Firstly, whereas the American literature examines various 
American agencies’ estimates of the numbers of bombers and missiles the Soviets possessed or 
could produce, the British literature does not. Rather, nuclear history literature utilises a slightly 
broader brush stroke to examine the question of British vulnerability, but does not outline the 
process of determining the threat. Authors such as Clark and Wheeler, and Baylis examine 
developing British vulnerability to the Soviet strategic forces – indeed, Clark and Wheeler highlight 
that ‘British strategy was rooted in vulnerability.’93 However, intelligence assessment, agencies, and 
processes rarely feature in their analyses. For example, Clark and Wheeler offer no real insight into 
the process of how or why Britain was unimpressed by Eisenhower’s belief that the US was 
threatened by the Soviet Air Force in the mid-1950s.94 Similarly, Baylis highlights the significance of 
intelligence appreciations of the growing strength of the Soviets’ IRBM force and the threat they 
posed to Britain’s V-bombers, but does not engage in depth with the process of gathering and 
processing the intelligence.95 For the intelligence historian, the nuclear history literature often 
offers more questions than answers. 
The intelligence studies literature highlights Britain’s vulnerability but sheds little light on 
process. Cole, for example, is the exception as well as the rule in this case. His study examines 
British estimates of the Soviet IRBM threat and their influence in the cancellation of Blue Streak, 
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and presents intelligence assessments of the readiness and production of various Soviet missiles. 
He demonstrates that the rationale behind the Blue Streak missile, as a land-based fixed system, 
was undercut as the intelligence assessments demonstrated a higher state of Soviet readiness. His 
article is almost alone in engaging with British assessments of the IRBM threat - but exemplifies the 
broader literature in engaging more with the outcome rather than the process and not mentioning 
the role of the JIB. 
From the late 1940s to the mid-to-late 1950s the scale of the Soviets’ bomber programme 
was key to British security.96  The vulnerability of Britain was intimately tied to the development of 
the Soviet bomber on two ways: firstly, monitoring the development of the Soviet bomber force 
illustrated the immediate threat Britain would face from the air; and secondly, monitoring the 
development of the Soviet intercontinental bomber provided an indication of when the Soviets 
might be ready to launch an attack on the US, and therefore how safe Britain was under the 
American nuclear umbrella. As the Air Defence Committee stated, ‘when New York is vulnerable to 
eradication, the USA will not use her strategic weapon in defence of London.’97  
Nevertheless, the Soviet intercontinental bomber force would only ever be able to start a 
war with the US, who would have sufficient warning to launch a counter-strike. Unlike the UK the 
US did not face annihilation. However, should the Soviets develop a sufficiently large ICBM force 
there was a danger that the US’ retaliatory capacity could be pre-empted, and that a substantial 
number of its cities could be struck. Twigge and Scott delve deepest in to the JIB’s missile 
intelligence. The key insight they offer surrounds the differing nature of British and American 
estimates of the Soviet missile threat. They present evidence that in 1955 the chief scientific 
adviser to the Ministry of Defence advised the government that the Soviet ICBM would not be 
operational until 1965, and that this advice was based on JIB assessments.98 Moreover, this more 
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optimistic attitude towards the development of the Soviet missile threat, compared with American 
estimates, was a relatively consistent feature in British reporting in the 1950s. Kenneth Strong 
informed the Chiefs of Staff in 1958 that ‘logistical and operational factors’ would delay the 
development of the Soviet missile threat.99 Aldrich concurs, showing how British analysts disagreed 
with their American counterparts over the lag between testing and deployment: the British 
believed there would be a gap whereas sections of the US intelligence community believed one 
would immediately follow the other.100  
These authors state that, essentially, Britain saw no ‘missile gap’. What the British view of 
the politics of the missile gap was remains to be discovered. Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientist to the 
Ministry of Defence, provides a fleeting glimpse into the distain certain members of the defence 
establishment may have felt for the politicised nature of the issue in America. In February 1961, 
during a visit to Washington, he had become aware that President Kennedy had backed away from 
his campaign claims of Soviet supremacy in intercontinental missiles. He was later invited to meet 
Kennedy, and, as he recounted, ‘the President asked, “what do you think of my missile gap?’ I could 
only answer, “What missile Gap, Mr President?” at which he laughed as though the whole thing had 
been a vast joke.’101  
As Reynolds wrote, the ‘intelligence relationship is at the heart of what makes the Anglo-
American tie different from other alliances.’102 Despite the restrictions on the transfer and 
discussion of atomic and atomic-related intelligence imposed by the McMahon act of 1946, Andrew 
believes the relationship was characterised by an ‘unprecedented level of intimacy.’103 And 
according to Prados, ‘missile intelligence was perhaps one area where Anglo-American cooperation 
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was closest.’104 The intelligence communities pooled and discussed their intelligence and 
conclusions during a series of conferences, which continued throughout the 1950s, and often 
became a forum for the airing of dissatisfaction with the other community’s assessments.105 Given 
this level of cooperation it must be assumed that trans-Atlantic disagreements were based on 
interpretation rather than on information, and this thesis will investigate these different 
interpretations.106 
Debates over missile and bomber assessments were internal as well as transatlantic. There 
was a relatively fierce battle between the Air Ministry and the JIB over leadership in guided weapon 
intelligence. Indeed, this was the biggest bone of contention in the JIB’s relationship with any of the 
services; according to Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, S. O. Bufton, relations 
between JIB and the Air Ministry had been excellent before the development of the guided weapon 
threat.107 Twigge and Scott note the Air Ministry believed that any aspect of the airborne threat 
was the prerogative of air intelligence, as only airmen would have the necessary ‘feel’ for the 
issues.108 These issues prompted a report by Sir Gerald Templer who examined the division of 
responsibility for missile intelligence. His report, to the dismay of the Air Ministry, recommended 
that JIB take the lead in analysing the guided missile threat.109 The insights into this episode that 
Twigge and Scott, and Aldrich provide prompt several interesting questions about the growing 
power of the JIB.  
None of the authors alluded to above provide an exhaustive analysis of Britain’s estimates 
of the Soviets’ bomber and missile capabilities. Nor do autobiographies and biographies of key 
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political and military personalities from the period provide much in the way of detail.110 Harold 
Macmillan, is perhaps most revealing about Britain’s vulnerability and understanding of the Soviet 
Union’s striking prowess. He was clear in his mind that Britain faced complete destruction in the 
age of the long-range bomber and missile: ‘…there is no defence possible to us, except as members 
and partners in a great alliance.’111 Britain could deter the Soviets only through possession of a 
guarantee from the US’ Strategic Air Command. But, in 1956, when the Soviets threatened Britain 
with missiles during the Suez crisis Macmillan believed ‘the British government rated them at their 
true value’, suggesting firstly, that he was aware of Khrushchev’s tendency towards bluff and 
exaggeration; and secondly, that he was confident that the Soviets did not have the capability to 
strike the US decisively and massively.112  The intelligence assessments that gave him such 
confidence will be examined below. 
 
Liaison 
Given its imperial heritage, British intelligence has historically maintained an international focus 
and developed valuable liaison relationships. Many aspects of this legacy are well covered in the 
intelligence literature, in particular Britain’s early intrigues on India’s north-west frontier. The 
adventurous British officers and British-controlled Indian agents who secretly mapped the 
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mountain passes that could serve as invasion points for the Russians or the Afghans are, in a sense, 
the JIB’s antecedents.113  
 But the most significant developments in Britain’s liaison relationships occurred in the 
Twentieth Century, during and after the Second World War, and with the Americans. Indeed, 
students of British-American relations note that intelligence is one of the areas where the 
relationship can justifiably be labelled ‘special.’114 There is a significant literature devoted to the 
subject. The key wartime and post-war treaties concerning intelligence sharing, the UKUSA 
agreements, have recently been released to the archives.115  The mechanics of liaison have also 
been set-out by Richelson and Ball, and many authors have engaged with specific aspects of 
transatlantic cooperation;116 cooperation in gathering intelligence in occupied Germany, in aerial 
intelligence gathering and covert operations, in monitoring the development of the Soviet atomic 
threat, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to name but a limited number.117 
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 The transatlantic relationship was the most significant for Britain after the war. And the 
Americans also benefitted: Britain’s imperial legacy meant that it could provide assets in areas of 
the globe where the US lacked capability, in the Middle East, for example. And Britain still 
controlled territories that were of immense value in targeting the USSR with technical assets: the 
‘residual empire.’118 But, although the role of Australian and Canadian intelligence agencies in the 
UKUSA framework have been noted, the development of these countries’ intelligence communities 
and the mechanics of cooperation has received comparatively little attention. The post-war 
reorganisation has, of course, been studied. Andrew and Wark outline how JIBs were created in 
both countries, mirroring developments in London.119 But there is little examination of the 
significance of Dominion organisations in Western intelligence cooperation. This leaves a 
considerable gap in our understanding of the relationship between Britain and the Dominions after 
the Second World War. 
 The literature demonstrates that the JIB was very active internationally. Ambrose, for 
instance, highlights the importance of Kenneth Strong’s relationship with Eisenhower; Ball alludes 
to the JIB’s role in liaison with the Americans over targeting; Hershberg outlines the JIB’s role in 
supplying the Americans with intelligence from Cuba; Twigge and Scott suggest that JIB-CIA 
relations were probably as close as SIS-CIA ties.120 But none deals systematically with the JIB’s 
liaison relationships in its varied fields of activity. The most thorough engagement is to be found in 
R. H. Mathams’ memoirs Sub Rosa.121 He recalls how after his training in Australia he was seconded 
to JIB London, where he worked on intelligence issues of the highest sensitivity; how JIB Australia’s 
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analyses of China and China’s nuclear development were transferred to London; and how the 
Australian JIB developed relations with the American intelligence community. His work highlights 
the important contribution of the Australian JIB on subjects of crucial importance, and the 
closeness of international JIB cooperation. Building upon his work, and the authors above, this 
thesis will argue that the cooperation was institutionalised, indeed networked, and that the system 
was designed to be so from the outset. It will examine the JIB’s relationship with the Dominions, 
the US, and with businesses, from which JIB gathered valuable Osint.  
 
The End of the JIB 
Aldrich noted that military intelligence in the years following the Second World War is among the 
most under-studied aspects of British intelligence.122 A survey of the literature engaging with the 
reorganisation of the higher machinery of British defence, the developments which yielded the DIS, 
bears out his point; intelligence does not feature prominently in any major analysis.  Michael 
Howard’s paper, The Central Organisation of Defence, is illustrative of this trend. He provides a 
thorough analysis of Secretary of Defence Thorneycroft’s and Chief of the Defence Staff 
Mountbatten’s reforms of the higher machinery of defence, which includes an examination of the 
machinery for procurement, administration, and policy. But his engagement with the matter of 
intelligence is extremely limited. 123 
 Similarly fleeting references are to be found in Johnson’s Defence by Ministry. He, however, 
includes an extra dimension by noting that Lord Mountbatten, then Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), 
enthusiastically advocated reform of defence intelligence, arguing that it would deliver extra 
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economy and higher quality intelligence.124 Johnson does not develop this detail.  This silence is 
largely unbroken by other significant texts on British defence organisation in the period.125  
Of course, it is plausible to contend that the absence of sustained engagement with 
intelligence in the broader literature on defence reorganisation is a reflection of the relative 
absence of intelligence from the higher-level political debates leading to the reorganisation. This 
view has a certain merit, but it should not be given too much credence. Should the contention be 
framed as a question the short answer would be ‘yes and no’.  
It was acknowledged by Strong in 1950 that it was ‘impracticable to carry the centralisation 
of intelligence further and faster that the centralisation of defence as a whole.’126 Therefore, one 
might argue that the organisation of military intelligence would necessarily be subordinate to the 
more prominent debates of national defence, explaining its relative absence from the literature. 
Indeed, the major issues facing policy makers and planners during this period concerned the 
economy and efficiency of the entire armed services.  
The matter of economy – financial savings – was always present in post-war debates about 
national defence.127 But in the 1950s and early 1960s British strategic vulnerability increased with 
developments in Soviet military technology; policy makers realised that in order to meet it and 
achieve economies the defence machine would have to be reformed. In 1957 Harold Macmillan 
appointed Duncan Sandys as his Defence Minister with a brief to restructure Britain’s armed forces, 
‘to rely in future on nuclear deterrence as the basis of Britain’s defence posture and to secure “a 
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substantial reduction in expenditure and manpower.”’128 His reforms included phasing out of 
conscription by 1960, the reduction of the British Army on the Rhine, cuts in tactical air power, and 
the authorisation of the intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missile, Blue Streak, and the air-
delivered ‘stand-off’ missile, Blue Steel.129 These reforms did not cut costs to a significant enough 
degree; according to Dockrill, one of the factors that drove Peter Thorneycroft’s drive for 
centralisation in 1963 was an awareness of the possible economies to be gained from a reorganised 
and modernised defence establishment.130 
 The question of economy was supplemented by mattes of efficiency. This was the major 
concern of Mountbatten. His believed that effective warfighting was a matter of joint operations 
that could best be controlled by a centralised command structure. Such views were developed 
during his tenure as Chief of Combined Operations in 1942 and later during his time at NATO 
command in Malta.131 He distanced himself from army and air force resistance to the Sandys 
reforms in 1957-8, before being appointed as CDS in 1959 and creating unified commands in 
overseas theatres of war.132 Howard believes that such a move was ‘in terms of both tactics and of 
organisation, an almost essential preliminary to any fundamental change at the centre.’133 
Supported by Mountbatten, Thorneycroft tasked Lord Ismay, who had recently retired from being 
First Secretary to NATO, and Sir Ian Jacob, formerly Military Assistant Secretary to Churchill’s War 
Cabinet, to propose reforms to the higher organisation of defence.134 
In their report, Ismay and Jacob made no recommendations regarding the organisation of 
intelligence; nor is the matter mentioned in Lord Ismay’s memoirs.135 This could account for the 
absence of references to intelligence in the literature. However, policymakers certainly considered 
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matter of intelligence organisation. The lack of engagement with the topic is probably more related 
to access to documents than significance. Many of the key texts on defence reorganisation were 
written in the 1970s and 1980s, roughly coinciding with the birth of significant academic literature 
on British intelligence and its influence on policy and decision.136 The majority of academics’ focus 
was elsewhere, and given the rarity of released documentary material relating to intelligence the 
lack of interest was reinforced by lack of access. 
Recent literature offers more details about the creation of the DIS. It demonstrates that 
intelligence was included in the deliberations of senior policymakers and Chiefs of Staff on the 
organisation of British defence. Indeed, since the reorganisation of British intelligence following the 
Second World War, there had been an almost rolling review of the intelligence machinery and its 
effectiveness.  
Cavendish-Bentinck, the wartime Chairman of the JIC, reviewed the wartime organisation 
of the intelligence machinery early in 1945, and a JIC paper on the ‘Post War Organisation of 
Intelligence’ followed his review.137 These reviews led to the creation of the JIB. Soon after came Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill’s report into the organisation of the intelligence machinery, which 
led to the redefining of the JIC and its charter.138 In 1950 Kenneth Strong’s pressure for the 
centralisation of all operational intelligence staffs in one building drew the matter of intelligence 
organisation to the attention of the Minister of Defence, Emanuel Shinwell. Shinwell supported the 
plan and made his case to Attlee, but the CoS successfully resisted the move arguing that the 
present system was working well.139 Upon his re-election, Winston Churchill was reportedly 
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‘dismayed’ to discover an unruly and inefficient organisation responsible for dealing with scientific 
intelligence and set about righting the matter. R. V. Jones, the head of wartime scientific 
intelligence, was recalled to government service but failed to rectify the situation. He retired in 
1954. During the upheaval Sir Frederick Brundrett conducted an investigation into service 
intelligence and concluded that greater centralisation was necessary. As a result the Directorate of 
Scientific Intelligence (DSI) was absorbed by the JIB in September 1954.140  
Concurrently, another high-level investigation into the machinery of intelligence was 
conducted, this one examining the machinery of atomic intelligence. The Daniel Report set out to 
evaluate the ‘performance of the UK atomic intelligence organisation to date’ and offer 
recommendations as to its future.141 In its wake, Churchill ‘approved the transfer’ of the Atomic 
Energy Intelligence Unit to the JIB.142 In addition to these significant investigations there were, 
according to Aldrich, several Treasury-led investigations into the intelligence organisation 
throughout the 1950s.143 And the 1960s saw a continuation of the investigative trend with the 
Templer review of service intelligence, which suggested deeper centralising of intelligence in 
certain areas of inter service significance.144 These reviews, their readership and instigators, confirm 
that the intelligence machinery was indeed a high profile issue amongst senior defence and political 
figures. 
 Integration and centralisation were prominent themes in these reviews, and they 
demonstrate that that the establishment of the DIS was the culmination of a lengthy battle 
between those who argued for the centralisation of intelligence and those who favoured the 
service agencies retaining their spheres of responsibility. Indeed, the centralisers had argued their 
case since the end of the Second World War. As Michael Herman states, from 1945 there existed a 
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vision of a ‘total all source intelligence institution, studying and understanding foreign situations as 
a whole.’145 But, as Twigge and Scott highlight, whereas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
fulfilled such a role in the US, the service agencies in the UK guarded their prerogatives and 
successfully prevented the establishment of an analogous organisation.146  
Despite being ‘the only genuinely inter-service organisation in Whitehall,’ the JIB was not 
designed to infringe on the existing prerogatives of the service intelligence agencies.147 However, 
over time, as it grew, the JIB inevitably infringed on service intelligence territory. Those advocating 
central intelligence were biding their time and gathering support. Former JIC Chairman Percy 
Cradock views JIB’s establishment as a ‘first step in the direction of full integration of defence 
intelligence.’148 Kenneth Strong – an ‘evangelist’ of centralisation – was aware of the fact that the 
organisation of intelligence must conform with the wider organisation of defence and that it was 
‘impracticable to carry the centralisation of intelligence further and faster than the centralisation of 
defence as a whole.’149 Instead he pursued centralisation incrementally, expanding the JIB’s remit 
to include scientific, technical, and atomic intelligence.150 According to Cradock, when the DIS was 
established with the JIB as its ‘nucleus,’ and with Strong as its Director, his ‘victory’ over the CoS 
was finally achieved.151 However, the details of Strong’s victory, and the debates and analyses on 
the system as it stood before the integration are not revealed in the literature. 
 There exists, however, a short, but detailed, analysis of the aftermath to the reorganisation 
of defence intelligence. Davies examines how the creation of the DIS affected relation and 
communication with his focus institution.152 He describes the initial change as being ‘fairly chaotic,’ 
and notes that issues such as re-naming the amalgamated service departments led to confusion 
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and conflict.153 Moreover, he highlights that the process of reorganisation was protracted; the DIS 
did not adopt its longer term form until 1966 when the former service elements were merged in 
‘functional’ sections. This thesis will expand upon these details 
 
The Archives 
It was not so long ago that the retention of intelligence material from The National Archives, and 
consequently the absence of intelligence from diplomatic and military history, led to Andrew and 
Dilks labelling it as ‘the Missing Dimension.’154 Much has changed since then, and a significant 
amount of intelligence material is available in Kew. However, this has brought with it its own set of 
problems. As Aldrich highlights, only a small proportion of government material is retained; and, 
given its incomplete state, it should be treated with caution.155  
 But dependence on the archive cannot be avoided. The historian of the JIB faces a 
particular set of challenges. The main issue is the poor cataloguing of JIB papers. Despite its broad 
remit, many divisions, and extensive liaison links, there is no TNA class-mark for the JIB (unlike MI5 
and GCHQ, which are stored in KV and HW); its papers are part of its parent department, the 
Ministry of Defence, catalogue (DEFE). Its internal memoranda, correspondence, notes and so on – 
the material stored in the so-called ‘registered files’, like DEFE 21, for example – have not been 
systematically collated and filed. And the main stores of JIB papers, in DEFE 44 and DEFE 60, are 
almost exclusively finished reports of the ‘data warehousing’ kind. Therefore, whilst it is possible to 
study the scale and scope of the JIB’s ‘data warehousing’ output, it is difficult to examine the 
organisation’s day-to-day activities, what demands other departments made of it, and how it 
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fulfilled these requirements. Indeed, the bulk of the material in DEFE 44 and 60 is of marginal value, 
as there is no indication of who, if anyone, made use of it.  
 The second challenge is, paradoxically, related to the solution to the first, and is related to 
the volume of files that must be searched to uncover JIB material. A significant amount of JIB 
material is available in the files of its customer departments. Therefore, to research the JIB one 
must examine a wide range of file series (using JIB as a basic keyword search on the TNA catalogue 
yields results stored across 12 departments).156 The researcher must essentially build his or her own 
JIB archive. This is neither original nor surprising. Many historians of British intelligence have 
utilised this approach to cast light on several aspects of British intelligence.157 Indeed, given the 
limited release of intelligence material, this has been the only way to gain insights into certain 
topics. In the case of the JIB, a significant amount of papers can be uncovered in the files of the 
Cabinet Office, the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign Office.  
The issue that arises from this situation is that many sections of this thesis will refer to JIB 
figures, opinions and arguments but will not refer to specific JIB documents. This is because JIB 
material is in other departments’ documents, or in committee reports. For example, chapter three 
draws on many reports from the DEFE 10 series, which was a particularly rich seam for JIB material 
relating to economic intelligence. However, these documents are the product of the Security 
Exports Control Working Party (SECWP), not the JIB, and are referred to accordingly. But, although 
operating through other departments’ files poses problems in terms of the volume of material to 
sift, it is also advantageous in several respects. The advantages include: demonstrating how its 
customer departments used the JIB; how intelligence was used to support policy; and the breadth 
of the JIB’s activities. Gaining such insights is immensely valuable in demonstrating the significance 
of the JIB. 
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 Of course, The National Archives in Kew is but one repository of relevant evidence. The 
material therein is supplemented by materials in numerous other official archives and collections of 
private papers. The usefulness of foreign archives, particularly the American archives, to 
researchers of British intelligence has long been noted.158 Materials unavailable in Kew are often 
available in College Park. And given the international nature of the JIB, it is not surprising that 
valuable material was available in foreign archives: American, Canadian, and Australian. For 
example, the most comprehensive outline of the JIB’s organisation, circa 1949, is to be found in 
College Park.159 Similarly, following in the footsteps of Andrew, and others, this thesis has sought to 
exploit some private collections for intelligence related material.160 Kenneth Strong destroyed his 
papers, but material has been uncovered in numerous locations.161This has been useful in several 
areas: Eisenhower’s papers provided details on the former President’s relationship with Strong; Earl 
Mountbatten’s papers offered many insights into the creation of the DIS. All were a valuable 
supplement to The National Archives.  
 The third challenge is official secrecy. Many JIB documents on key subjects are retained.162 
These include materials on intelligence and targeting, materials on bomber and missile production, 
atomic intelligence, and materials pertaining to the creation of DIS.  
 The Freedom of Information Act, which is intended to provide historians and researchers 
with a form of recourse in the face of unreasonable secrecy, has been rendered useless in many 
cases. Two issues stand out in this respect. Several files have been retained as they are subject to 
‘absolute exemption under the *Freedom of Information+ Act’ -that is, under section 2.3, 
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‘information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.’163 Some files, for 
example DEFE 60/198 ‘Aircraft Factory and Ulan-Ude’ will remain closed until their next review in 
2018. Secondly, according to the Ministry of Defence, many files have been stored in a central 
London facility which was ‘very close to where asbestos was discovered in the Spring of 2003.’ 164 
The affected records were taken to a ‘facility on the outskirts of London, pending a decision on how 
best to regain access to the information they hold without risk to those handling them.’165 The 
process of recovering the documents has seriously slowed the review process; little can be done to 
expedite it; many files have been lost to mould and damp.  
There are precious few weapons available to fight the neutralisation of the Freedom of 
Information Act. The reluctance to release files in the specific case of the JIB’s estimates on the 
Soviet missile threat suggests that although the rhetoric of freedom of information has altered 
practice has not. Christopher Andrew’s 1977 statement that ‘the cult of secrecy which still 
surrounds the British intelligence services goes far beyond what is desirable, what is necessary, far 
beyond even what is justifiable,’ seems to be applicable today, to a degree.166 After all, it is absurd 
to state that releasing 55 year-old files detailing estimates of the production of TU-4 bombers will 
compromise national security. The Americans have revealed their NIEs outlining the influence of 
the U2, Penkovsky, and more detailed Elint, so withholding British analyses to protect sources and 
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methods is unnecessary. The blanket refusal to release the JIB’s missile intelligence is a blunt 
instrument with which to silence the historian. Indeed, this episode is a far cry from the more 
‘sophisticated “information control”’ that Aldrich feared would prevail in the post Waldegrave 
era.167 Rather, it is the same locked door, but with a note that reads ‘try again later’ rather than 
‘closed for business.’ 
 Both the literature and the documentary evidence have their limitations. The literature 
does not offer a comprehensive enough account of the JIB’s creation, its work, or its end. It is a 
largely unknown agency. The documentary evidence is poorly catalogued, diffuse, and often 
unavailable. Nevertheless, the need for a study of the JIB is clear and this thesis aims to expand our 
understanding of the agency and its operations significantly.  
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